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Abstract:   We analyze agent response to disparate payment schedules for protection 
of critical habitat units for the Seller sea lion in Alaska. The model allows 
for identification of implicit and explicit discount rates using information 
from a system of maximum likelihood equations. Testing is done using 
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  The temporal treatment of payment schedules in stated preference applications is 
a subject to be taken seriously by researchers attempting to value willingness to pay 
(WTP) for non-market goods. Much research has been directed towards sequencing and 
scope issues, as well as the properties of alternative payment mechanisms (Carson, 1997). 
Many of these studies pay particular attention to incentive structures inherent in the 
survey design, yet relatively little has been written about the time preference for 
payments of environmental goods. Especially when the program in question provides a 
pure public good, likely financed by tax dollars, it seems inappropriate to frame a 
dichotomous choice question in terms of a one-shot, lump-sum payment, when the true 
payment vehicle would likely be a stream of payments over time. Similarly, analysis of 
the benefits of the program should incorporate the temporal dimensions of the benefits 
stream, especially if the time periods differ between the two. 
  Much of the literature that does, in fact, mention bid treatment over time looks at 
sensitivity of summary measures of willingness to pay for a particular good or set of 
goods across the treatments. It was found that in eliciting willingness to pay for a toxic 
waste treatment facility in British Colombia, for example, respondents as a group did not 
distinguish between payment schedules of one and five years (Kahneman and Knetsch, 
1992), violating the standard economic assumption of a positive discount rate. Expanding 
this idea, Stevens, DeCoteau, and Willis (1997) compared both scale and temporal 
embedding effects for both a public good (salmon restoration) and a private good (movie 
passes at a local theatre), and concluded that responses are not invariant to payment 
schedule.
 The authors also indicated in a footnote that an implicit assumption about the 








discount rates from mean WTP estimates. Both of these studies used open-ended 
elicitation methods, with Kahneman and Knetsch conducting phone interviews and 
Stevens, et. al. collecting their data via a questionnaire.  
  Strumborg, Baerenklau, and Bishop (2001) studied temporal payment mechanism 
response in a contingent valuation study of Lake Mendota in Wisconsin, which elicited 
responses via a mail survey with a modified payment card and randomly split the sample 
into three and ten year treatment groups, with program benefits explicitly capped at ten 
years. They found that, if market discount rates are assumed, the ten-year subsample 
yields net present values that are higher than the three-year subsample.
1 Chavas and 
Mullarkey (2002) develop a model of valuation under temporal future learning 
uncertainty and irreversibility in the policy decision arena. They find that in the face of 
temporal uncertainty, there is a risk premium that is added to the willingness to pay for 
the option value of a natural resource. It seems logical that the higher the level of 
uncertainty, the larger the risk premium. Following this logic, it may be the case the risk 
premium may be higher for projects that extend further into the future because of the 
future learning that occurs with the resource under consideration. In other words, there 
may be a risk premium that has a negative correlation with future discounting because of 
uncertainty and irreversibility of the resource change. Finally, van der Pol and Cairns 
(2001) used discrete choice data to calculate implicit discount rates for health by 
collecting multiple data points on each respondent, and found that discounting varied by 
certain demographic and elicitation method characteristics. 
  This paper extends the line of research by analyzing agent response to payment 
schedule for a pure public good, protection of critical habitat units for the Steller sea lion 
                                                 








in Alaska that generates an infinite stream of benefits over the life of the program. We 
proceed as follows: the next section develops the theoretical model, which allows for 
estimation of explicit discount rates through normalization to the one-year responses. The 
model is then tested using the Steller sea lion dataset by calculating implicit discount 
rates from mean willingness to pay across two additional payment horizons. Next, the 
explicit discount rates are estimated for those subsamples that exhibit significant 
differences in slope coefficients across treatments. Finally, we discuss the implications 
for future research and analysis. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Suppose an independent sample of respondents is presented with a survey which 
solicits willingness to pay for a public program with different repayment periods. 
Specifically, individual i is asked whether s/he is willing to pay Bi dollars per year for ni 
years for the provision of the public program.  If the program is supplied, it provides a 
stream of benefits over an infinite time horizon.
2 As the program embodies costs and 
benefits over time, any expression for WTP necessarily embodies the individual￿s 
discount rate. Thus, we model the program choice as a comparison between the net 
present values (NPV) of the payments stream and the benefits stream. 
The (finite) payment stream can be expressed as the difference between two 
infinite streams; one beginning in year 0, and the other beginning in year ni-1. Assuming 




0(Bi) = Bi + 
1
(1+r) Bi + 
1
(1+r)
2 Bi + ￿    
                                                 















(1+r) Bi + 
1
(1+r)
2 Bi + 
1
(1+r)










0(Bi) = Bi • 
1+r
 r  .   (1) 












ni Bi • 
1+r




ni - 1 Bi • 
1
 r  .  (2) 
Subtraction of (2) from (1) yields the NPV to individual i of a finite stream of payments 
beginning now and ending in year ni-1: 
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Assuming the annual benefit received by the individual is given by the measure WTPi, 
and the benefits accrue over an infinite time horizon, the NPV of the benefit stream is 
given by 
WTPi








year for ni years for the program, the respondent votes yes so long as the NPV of benefits 
is at least equal to the NPV of the payment stream given by (3). 
  Of course, the researcher does not observe the true WTPi as it is a latent variable. 
Instead, we define yi as an observable binary variable with the following properties: 
 y i = 1 if 
WTPi
r  ≥ PVn(Bi)  
 y i = 0 if 
WTPi
r  < PVn(Bi) .  (4) 
Assuming that the true data generating process for annual individual benefits is 
WTPi = Xiβ + σεi, where εi ~ N (0,1),
3 the probability of observing a ￿no￿ response from 
an individual facing bid B
n
i can be written as 
 Prob{yi = 0} = Prob{
WTPi
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r  • δ(r,ni)},  (5) 
where for simplicity, δ(r,ni) ≡ (1 + r ￿ 
1
(1+r)
 ni-1). Note that the probability statement 
in (5) is a straightforward generalization of Cameron (1988), explicitly taking the time 
dimensions of the payment and benefit streams into consideration. Isolating B
n
i  then 
yields 
                                                 
3 Although this model assumes a single-index linear specification, generalization to non-linear functional 
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which illustrates the fact that it is impossible to estimate β, σ, and r separately without 
some sort of normalization.  
  Note that in the absence of the discount factor, the presence of the annual bid B
n
i  
would permit identification of the β  coefficient vector, allowing for calculation of the 
scale of WTP directly from the latent variable formulation. While this is not be possible 
here, as there are three parameters of interest, it is nonetheless possible to identify the 
discount rate r and β  up to a scale σ, as is typical in standard logit and probit analysis, by 
normalization of the variance parameter to 1. Cameron￿s approach, therefore, can be used 
to identify exactly one additional parameter of interest, although doing so results in 
limiting oneself to speaking in terms of probabilities without additional assumptions on 
scale.
4 
  An alternative strategy, assuming at least two payment periods, is to normalize the 
parameter vector by r in estimation, thereby allowing for identification of location, scale, 
and the discount rate. This normalization allows the system of equations to be written 
such that one equation identifies location and scale, while the others identify r. 
Estimation then yields estimates of both r and the normalized parameters, from which the 
underlying parameter vectors can be recovered.  
  To illustrate the process, write (5) as 
                                                 
4 Of course, this does not preclude using methods such as the familiar approach popularized by Hanneman 
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r  • δ(r,ni)},  (7) 
where β* = β/r  and σ* = σ/r, and assume that we have data for two time treatments, n1 = 1 
and n2 > 1. Then the probability of a no response for individuals asked to pay over the 
two time streams can be expressed as 
 Prob{
WTPi
r  < NPV( B
1
i)} = Prob{Xiβ* + σ* εi < B
1
i }  (8) 
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r  • δ(r,ni)},  (9) 
making use of the fact that δ(r,1) = r  .  Again isolating the annual bid payment, the 
system defined by (8) and (9) can be rewritten as 
 Prob{
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1
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1
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or equivalently as 
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although this in itself does nothing to identify the extra parameter. However, comparing 
(9￿) to (8￿) suggests that we can use the one-year treatment to identify β* and σ*, and 
differences in the parameters from (8￿￿) to (9￿￿) are due solely to the discount factor. For 
a given r = r, then, one could test the hypothesis 
 H 0 : β
*











which would identify a range of r for which the data do not reject the hypothesis that r =  
r. 
  This methodology can be extended to directly estimate all of the parameters, 
including r, using equations (8￿) and (9￿) and restricting the parameter vectors to be 
identical, thus embodying the assumption that the same parameter vectors characterize 
annual WTP, and differences in the estimated coefficients are due to the discount factor 
alone. The log likelihood function can be developed by rewriting (9￿) so that 
   Prob{yi = 0} = Prob{εi < 
- Xiβ*
σ*







r } (10) 
Assuming normal errors, taking logs, and summing over the sample, the log likelihood 
function becomes 
   log  L  =  ∑
i=1
N
 {yi ln [1 ￿ Φ(- Xiβ*/σ*  + B
n
i /σ* • δ(r,ni)/r)]    
    + (1 ￿ yi) ln [Φ(- Xiβ*/σ*  + B
n
i /σ* • δ(r,ni)/r)]}  (11) 








GAUSS, is straightforward, and asymptotic standard errors for the parameter estimates 
will be correct so long as the density is correctly specified. The usual hypothesis tests can 
then be performed to empirically investigate a number of issues regarding intertemporal 
preferences within a CVM framework, including sensitivity of responses to the temporal 
payment schedule and testing if rates of time discount are significantly different from 
zero. In addition, one can extend the model to allow for endogenous variation in the 
discount rate parameter r over individuals, simply by specifying an appropriate functional 
form for r(z), such as the linear r(z) = z￿γ  + ε i, where z is an n x k subset of the exogenous 
regressor set x. Through this specification, we can test for significant differences in the 
discount rate between categories of respondents.  
 
SURVEY AND DATA 
  Giraud and Turcin (2001) collected referendum data on willingness to pay for a 
proposed expanded federal Steller sea lion recovery program off the coast of Alaska. This 
program consisted of increased restrictions on commercial fishing activity within the 
certain designated buffer zones around critical habitat units for the Steller sea lion, as 
well as a doubling of funding for research efforts to understand the ongoing population 
decline. Data was collected using the Dillman Tailored Design Method (2001) via a 
questionnaire that was mailed to a random sample of 1,000 households in each of three 
regions: the Alaskan Boroughs that contain the critical habitat and buffer zones, the state 
of Alaska, and the United States as a whole. After describing the relevant background 
information, assessing the respondent￿s views on endangered species management, and 








presented each agent with the following dichotomous choice question: 
￿If the Expanded Federal Steller Sea Lion Recovery Program was the only issue 
on the next ballot and it would cost your household $____ in additional Federal 
taxes every year for the next ____ year(s), would you vote in favor of it? (By law 
the funds could only be used for the Steller sea lion program.￿ 
 
Bid amounts for each of the three stratifications varied from $1 to $350, a range 
established by extensive use of focus groups and pre-testing. In addition to the varying 
bid amounts, there were also three temporal treatments of one, five, and fifteen years. 
Each respondent was asked to vote only once, and associated demographic information 
was collected at the end of the survey. A summary of the geographically pooled data used 
for analysis for each of the three temporal treatment groups is presented in Table 1. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  Before proceeding directly to the discount model, it is useful to examine the 
results from the prototypical lump-sum payment vehicle model, which in the current 
context assumes ni = 1. Separate coefficients were estimated for each of the three 
geographic subsamples, and the results are reported in Table 2. Due to the linear 
functional form of the data generating process, the β  coefficients give the marginal 
change in WTP for a one-unit change in each regressor, identified only up to location and 
scale, with no information regarding the temporal preferences of the agents.   
  For each subsample, ProSpec and ProJobs have the largest t-statistics of the 
explanatory variables, and are of the expected sign
5. These variables measure the 
generalized preferences of the respondents towards the major competing uses of the 
                                                 
5 It should be again noted that reported standard errors are computed from the inverse Hessian and are 








critical habitat units (endangered species protection versus commercial fishery activity 
and employment, respectively) via a non-consecutive series of three Likert-scale
6 
questions at the beginning of the survey. In addition, it has been argued that prior 
knowledge can influence WTP  (Giraud, et al., 1999), so binary variables for those 
respondents who indicated they had ￿read or heard anything￿ about the endangered 
Stellar sea lion (KnowSSL) or Alaskan coastal villages (KnowVil) are included as 
explanatory variables in each model. The significance of each, however, tends to decline 
as familiarity with the issue increases, as residents of Alaska were inundated with 
information regarding this highly contentious program. The coefficients on the indicator 
variable for Gender (Female = 1) and on the coefficient of Member, an indicator variable 
designating membership in an environmental organization, are marginally significant in 
at least one of the models, and are maintained throughout the paper. Despite the relatively 
large standard errors on the slope coefficients, perhaps a result of the small sample size 
resultant from the geographic stratification, the regressions as a whole are significant 
using a likelihood ratio test. 
  The next step in the procedure is to estimate the remaining equations in each 
system, as in equations (9￿) and  (9￿￿) above. For this data set, this implies two additional 
equations for each geographic subsample, corresponding to the five-year and fifteen-year 
payment treatments.  This provides information regarding the size of the discount rate r, 
as we use the relationship between the slope coefficients to provide point estimates of the 
parameter. As can be seen through manipulations of the above equations, the predicted 
net present value of willingness to pay over the infinite time horizon for, say, the 5 year 
treatment is  
                                                 
























 Xiβ* • 
r
δ(r,n5) ,  (12) 
where N5 is the number of observations in the particular five year treatment. Similarly, 
predictions for the one year treatment are 
 
WTP1






 Xiβ* .  (13) 
As the sample size becomes large, and assuming that differences in willingness to pay are 
solely the result of discounting, substitution of (13) in (12) yields 
 NPV  WTP5  =  NPV  WTP1  • 
r
δ(r,n5) ,  (14) 
with the bar denoting the mean. Equation (14) can be solved to provide implicit estimates 
of r, much as the previous literature has done.  
  The equations and estimates of willingness to pay and implicit discount rates are 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 for each of the subsamples and temporal treatments. We reject 
a zero willingness to pay only for the one and five year treatments in the Rest of U.S., the 
geographic difference explained primarily by the fact that a very high percentage of 
Alaskan residents are economically tied to the local fisheries relative to the rest of the 
United States through either themselves or family members. As such, protection of the 
habitat units may, in fact, constitute a ￿bad￿ rather than a good for many respondents, and 
their compensating variation may be negative. Comments received in focus groups, pre-
testing and on the survey itself indicate that some respondents viewed sea lions as a pest. 








unsuccessful and so the protection program should not continue. 
  The temporal dimension of estimated WTP across the subsamples is intriguing as 
well. A priori, we expect mean Xiβ*  to be largest for the one year treatment and decline 
with the length of the payment horizon, in accordance with equation (9￿). However, only 
the Rest of Alaska exhibits this pattern, and does so with the fifteen year point estimate 
turning negative, perhaps as a result of the aforementioned geographic effect.
7 The Rest 
of U.S. sample displays a higher value for the five year treatment than the one year, and 
the Boroughs sample switches the expected relationship between the five and fifteen year 
values. Undoubtedly, much of this effect is due to noise in the data and marginal 
explanatory power of the overall explanatory variables for this particular problem. 
Nevertheless, Table 4 shows that, at least for those not living in the Boroughs portion of 
Alaska, there is a definite tendency in the respondents towards distinguishing between the 
one year and fifteen year payment periods, but it is not as strong for the one and five year 
periods. Essentially, this conforms to earlier empirical findings in previous work 
(Stevens, DeCoteau, and Willis, 1997; Stumborg, Baerenklau, and Bishop, 2001; van der 
Pol and Cairns, 2001). 
  With these results in mind, we now move to explicit estimation of the discount 
rates, as given by maximization of the likelihood given by equation (11). Of course, in 
order to estimate any additional parameter, in this case, r, with a relative degree of 
efficiency, there must be variation between the unrestricted coefficient estimates reported 
in Tables 2 and 3 and a restricted model which forces these coefficients to be equal. If 
                                                 
7 As is typical with contingent valuation analysis, the standard errors on WTP are large, and one cannot 
statistically reject equivalence of WTP for any temporal treatment within any one geographic group. In this 








this is not the case, then the data suggests that  
r
δ(r,ni) = 1, and there is no way to identify 
the rate of time preference using the methodology described in this paper. As such, the 
method itself will perform most adequately with large samples of well-behaved data, with 
relatively precise coefficient estimates. 
  Likelihood ratio tests on the Steller sea lion data confirm the fact that this sample 
does not have many of the desired properties necessary for efficient estimates of the 
discount parameter r.  Three of the six tests (including both for the Boroughs subsample) 
provide evidence that the restrictions are not binding, and thus the slope coefficients are 
not jointly significantly different between the one year and multiple year treatments, 
preventing explicit estimation of the discount rates. The remaining three equations are 
reported in Table 5.  
  Of the three estimated discount parameters, only one, for the Rest of Alaska 
sample, one vs. fifteen year treatment, is significantly different from zero, yet the sign is 
an infeasible -.74. The reader, however, will recall that the willingness to pay calculated 
in Table 4 changes sign from the one year to the fifteen year treatment, explaining the 
negative parameter estimate.  
  While the remaining estimates are asymptotically significant only at a low level of 
confidence for the individual r parameters, a likelihood ratio test can be performed to 
assess if the model including the discount rate explains the data as well as a completely 
unrestricted model. In the case of the Rest of Alaska, one vs. five year treatment, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the restricted discount model performs as well as the 








other than discounting account for the differences in the parameter estimates. One 
possible explanation is that the sample is that the special population of Alaska is 
bifurcated into those with especially strong preferences towards environmental quality, 
and those whose preferences are the polar opposite and whose livelihoods and economic 
security are directly impacted by the fishery, leading to heterogeneity of parameters 
within the sample that cannot be explained by time preferences alone. 
  The parameter estimate for the discount rate for the Rest of U.S, one vs. fifteen 
year treatment, is thus the only endogenously estimated r which is reasonable in both sign 
and magnitude, and explains the data as well as a completely unrestricted model. The 
implicit discount rate calculated for this subsample was .39, while the explicit point 
estimate is a slightly higher .48. Recovery of the true beta parameters (denoting the 
change in annual willingness to pay given a change in the regressor) using simple point 
estimates yields high annual marginal effects of $238.84 for ProSpec, $238.25 for 
ProJobs, and $215.10 for KnowSLL.  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
  The implicit discount rates from mean willingness to pay are quite high relative to 
market rates, but in line with those found by Stevens, DeCoteau, and Willis (1997) and 
Stumborg, Baerenklau, and Bishop (2001). Similarly, the results from the Rest of U.S. 
subsample match the Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) finding that five year intervals make 
little difference in estimated mean willingness to pay. However, when attempting to 
measure explicit discount rates for those subgroups for which it is possible under this 








statistical significance, and does not always explain the data as well as a model with 
separate coefficients for each temporal treatment.  
  The relatively small sample size and resultant inefficiency of parameter estimates 
is one explanation for this finding, and further research is necessary to test the 
applicability of this method to other data sets. We hypothesize that models that perform 
relatively better explaining the data and with larger sample sizes will have more success 
applying this method; for example, the efficiency gains using double-bounded instead of 
single-bounded elicitation methods may be utilized to further pinpoint the discount 
parameter estimates.  
  More generally, these results suggest that respondents are, in fact, sensitive to 
temporal payment schedules in a discrete choice format, at least in the long run. We 
further hypothesize that temporal embedding, as originally termed by Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992), may be commodity, survey, or even time specific. It seems clear that 
across the CV research to date, as in the marketable goods case, there is little empirical 
support for the theoretical argument that agents discount money streams at the market 
rate of interest. This raises important questions about the proper treatment of benefits in a 
public policy context when considering projects with a temporal component, as typically 
researchers and decision-makers compare net present values of benefits versus costs 
when making their recommendations or decisions.  
  Finally, as previously noted, expansion of the model to allow for the discount rate 
parameter to be a function of regressors would be straightforward, presuming one 
achieves given sufficient variation in the slope parameters. Van der Pol and Cairns 








Thaler (1981) found a negative relationship between dollar sums and discount rates. 
Furthermore, Stevens, DeCoteau, and Willis (1997) suggest that budget constraints may 
play a role in determining discount factors. One could, in principle, choose a functional 
form for these explanatory variables and let r = f(γ | Xi), thus allowing the discount rate 
to differ between individuals. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper introduced a model that allowed for explicit calculation of discount 
rate parameters given alternative temporal treatments of the bid vehicle in a contingent 
valuation context, along with a theoretical justification of calculation of implicit rates of 
discount using mean willingness to pay. Results suggest that respondents are more 
sensitive to payment period variation in the long run, and rates of discount are 
significantly higher than the market rate of interest. These findings are especially relevant 
with regards to pure public goods, such as the protection of endangered species, as 
recovery programs may often take many years and are unlikely to be financed with a 
lump-sum payment vehicle. Proper experiment design and execution, therefore, requires 
serious consideration of temporal payment issues in order to credibly present respondents 
with a realistic vehicle and to provide researchers with the proper information necessary 








Table 1: Summary Statistics - Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
   Vote  Bid
￿   ProSpec  ProJobs KnowSSL  KnowVil  Gender  Member   Age    Inc
￿ 
One Year   0.47   0.83   3.66   3.05   0.68   0.75   0.24   0.12    49.41    68.76 
n = 428    (0.50)  (1.03)  (1.03)  (1.11)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.32)   (12.55)    (41.32) 
                      
Five Year   0.49   0.80   3.68   2.75   0.66   0.72   0.27   0.15    49.43    65.13 
n = 391    (0.50)  (1.05)  (1.01)  (0.61)  (0.48)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.35)   (13.38)    (37.22) 
                      
Fifteen Year  0.38   0.76   3.61   2.76   0.69   0.78   0.23   0.14    49.61    73.81 
n = 385   (0.49)  (1.01)  (1.06)  (0.59)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (0.42)  (0.35)   (12.96)    (44.32) 
 
￿ Measured in $00.  ￿Measured in $000.  Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results, One Year Temporal Treatment 
 
  Rest of U.S.  Rest of AK AK Boroughs 
ProSpec  103.1 286.3  245.3 
  (44.92) (149.8)  (181.8) 
  2.295 1.911  1.349 
ProJobs  -98.7 -80.66 -368.1 
  (42.31) (63.71)  (268.3) 
  -2.332 -1.266  -1.372 
KnowSSL  103.3 145.6  -108 
  (71.01) (147.1)  (216.4) 
  1.455 0.9894 -0.4993 
KnowVil  -56 -262.8  -266.9 
  (57.78) (190.8)  (303.3) 
  -0.9691 -1.377  -0.88 
Gender  23.44 296.3  223.4 
  (59.37) (182.5)  (237.) 
  0.3948 1.624  0.9427 
Member  30.78 -353.4 -307.3 
  (118.4) (235.5)  (286.8) 
  0.26 -1.5 -1.071 
Constant  -28.89 -605.1  509.6 
  (205.4) (457.5)  (614.4) 
  -0.1407 -1.323  0.8294 
σ  182.6 327.9  583.4 
  (51.58) (157.2)  (412.4) 
  3.54 2.086 1.415 
      
Log Likelihood  -104.6 -114.6  -152.1 
n  112 142  174 








Table 3: Estimation Results, Five and Fifteen Year Treatments 
 
  Rest of U.S.  Rest of AK  AK Boroughs 
  Five Fifteen  Five Fifteen  Five Fifteen 
          
Prospec  145.3 107.7  243  92.11  167  173.1 
  (54.42) (27.92)  (91.28) (32.25)  (72.03) (58.13) 
  2.671 3.856  2.662 2.857  2.319 2.979 
Projobs  -175.5 -170.4  -220.8 -54.85  -176.9 -69.29 
  (78.29) (46.19)  (93.45) (40.31)  (85.46) (53.01) 
  -2.242  -3.69  -2.363 -1.361  -2.071 -1.307 
KnowSSL  93.01 110.9  -63.98  -13.13  67.76 39.59 
  (93.42) (60.12)  (99.58) (45.93)  (102.3) (82.78) 
  0.9956 1.844  -0.6425  -0.2859  0.6626  0.4783 
KnowVil  -130.7 64.54  165.1 2.918  -15.55 -74.21 
  (93.56) (46.87)  (145.7) (70.69)  (111.1) (91.84) 
  -1.397 1.377  1.133  0.04127  -0.14 -0.808 
Gender  -49 82.69 64.97  -1.138 -19.67  37.58 
  (69.48) (48.82)  (90.04) (53.46)  (76.2)  (63.92) 
  -0.7051 1.694  0.7215  -0.02129  -0.2581  0.5879 
Member  -48.66 -102.2  38.5  -7.645  -77.54 26.72 
  (91.83) (75.16)  (108.3) (48.97)  (103.1) (82.68) 
  -0.5299 -1.359  0.3556 -0.1561  -0.7519 0.3232 
One  58.83 13.42  -329.5 -189  -131.9  -419.6 
  (180.9) (127.3)  (302.4) (165.1)  (274.9)  (258.) 
  0.3253 0.1055  -1.09  -1.145  -0.4798 -1.626 
σ  233.1 115.6  254.2 124.4  271.2 226.1 
  (82.33) (28.4)  (91.53) (37.6)  (102.1)  (70.61) 
  2.831 4.071  2.778 3.307  2.656 3.202 
          
Log Likelihood -104.6 -83.72  -114.6 -113.3  -152.1 -156.1 
n  112  97  139 127  141 161 









Table 4: Mean Net Present Value Willingness to Pay  
and Associated Implicit Discount Rates 
 
     Mean   Implicit 
     Xiβ*  r 
Rest of U.S.        
  One Year Treatment   $121.50     
    (27.85)     
  Five Year Treatment   132.30    -2.01 
    (37.85)     
  Fifteen Year Treatment   34.32    0.39 
    (21.08)     
         
Rest of AK        
  One Year Treatment   $67.07     
    (44.34)     
  Five Year Treatment   38.71    1.36 
    (38.05)     
  Fifteen Year Treatment   -21.10   -- 
    (26.37)     
         
Boroughs        
  One Year Treatment   -$137.90     
    (159.8)     
  Five Year Treatment   -11.35    0.03 
    (44.05)     
  Fifteen Year Treatment   -31.46    0.29 
     (41.88)    








Table 5: Estimation Results, Explicit Discount Rates for Three out of Six 
Treatments 
 
   Rest of U.S.    Rest of AK    Rest of AK 
  One vs. Fifteen    One vs. Five    One vs. Fifteen 
           
ProSpec   162  312.5    385.8 
   (54.65)   (150.3)    (233.4) 
   2.965   2.079    1.653 
ProJobs   -161.6   -122.6    -103.2 
   (62.16)   (73.97)    (88.02) 
   -2.599   -1.657    -1.173 
KnowSSL   145.9   43.02    71.13 
   (76.49)   (96.15)    (129.7) 
   1.908  0.4475    0.5486 
KnowVil   12.47   -102.1    -266.1 
   (56.44)   (117.4)    (215.1) 
   0.221  -0.8702    -1.237 
Gender   90.39   137   195.8 
   (62.59)   (106.8)    (158.5) 
   1.444   1.283    1.235 
Member   -128.9   -147   -222.5 
   (102.4)   (132.9)    (196.) 
   -1.259   -1.106    -1.135 
Constant   -148.1   -646.1    -887.4 
   (172.5)   (399.3)    (638.6) 
   -0.8583   -1.618    -1.39 
σ    235.4   369.3    474.1 
   (71.46)   (171.1)    (277.8) 
   3.294   2.158    1.707 
r   0.4785   0.9247    -0.7438 
   (1.18)  (2.725)    (.186) 
   0.4056   0.3393    -4.005 
           
Log Likelihood  -90.06   -123.4    -118.7 
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